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Abstract 
 
In this paper, it is argued that a well-built, social network system 
has enabled the Mafia to reach a certain level of success through 
three main networks: members, local people, and politicians. I 
assert that the role of the executive power of the state has been 
partially supportive in this success. Moreover, this paper also 
concludes that to combat different Mafia groups, it is essential to 
know their strong and weak parts. Consequently, it is found that 
their well-built network system does not solely comprise of 
strong parts but that the weak parts also exist, albeit, that they 
have not yet played a defective role in the resolution of the 
Mafia. Therefore, this paper suggests that the illustration of both 
the strong and weak parts of these networks can have prominent 
and assisting role in the combat against the Mafia phenomenon 
in the future, either by strengthening the weak parts or by 
weakening the strong parts of its networks. 
 
Keywords: Mafia, social network analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The mafia phenomenon in Italy has been discussed widely from 
sociological, economical, psychological, etymological and political 
points of view whereas the social network system of the mafia 
from the approach of closed networks has not taken its place in 
the literature. Therefore, this paper aims to focus on the social 
network system of the different Mafia associations so as to fill 
the gap in the mafia studies. I need to mention the name of the 
prosecutor, Giovanni Falcone, who was murdered in 1992 by 
Sicilian Mafia (Cosa Nostra) as the source of inspiration of this 
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paper through his words about the Mafia:1 "We have to learn to 
think about the methods of Cosa Nostra calmly and with an open 
mind."2 Hopefully, this paper shows a distinctive analysis on how 
different Mafia groups have built their methods through up-to-
date networks, reaching a certain level of success. The main aim 
of this paper is not to show how to combat the Mafia by using its 
networks but to examine how they built their networks and 
illustrating the strong and weak parts of these networks in order 
to assist the fight against the Mafia.  
 
In the first section, the paper emphasizes the theoretical and 
methodological reasoning of the paper. The paper highlights the 
social networks application to organized crimes, and finally, it 
explains the differential organizations theory of Matsueda3, before 
taking a further step and commencing the network analysis of 
organized crime in Italy.  
 
In the second part, the notion is regarded firstly with the 
members of the Italian Mafia associations. This is necessary to 
comprehend what kind of formation they have, how they gain 
new members and build a system of recruitment, the importance 
of leadership, and their communicative and descriptive type of 
relationship. Moreover, pentito (Mafioso who collaborates with the 
judicial authorities) is explained as a concept of the weak part of 
these networks. The open and closed network system of 
Matsueda4 is used to define their network system after gaining a 
new member and in altering the type of relationship among the 
members. 
 
In the third section, the main topic will be Italian Mafia groups’ 
infiltration into the local people, how they have dominated the 
people in the local regions, and subordinated them on behalf of 
their own targets. To make the argument clear, the historical link 
                                                
1  Mafia is used as a term to refer to Italian organized crime. Different mafia groups  Cosa Nostra 
(Sicily), the Camorra (Campania), the ‘Ndrangheta (Calabria), and the Sacra Corona Unita (Apuglia). 
2  Diego Gambetta, "The Sicilian Mafia," Five Books, 6 October 2009, 6. 
3  Ross L. Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime," Crime, Law, and 
Social Change 46 (2006): 3-33. 
4  Matsueda, "Differential social organization," 3-33. 
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of the Mafia groups in rural and urban regions based on the 
economic, sociological, and cultural facts of these regions are 
presented.  
 
In the fourth section, Mafia groups’ network with the politicians is 
the main concern of this part. In this section, the corrupted 
politicians and different Mafia groups’ relationships are broadly 
described. In the next step, my argument suggests that there has 
never been consistent and cooperative commitment among 
politicians from the ruling and opposition parties in the fight 
against the Mafia. Furthermore, I assert that it is easy to break 
the relationship between politicians and Mafia groups. By using 
Matsueda’s two strong closed networks and a weak tie figure5, I 
define this relationship as weak tie of the two closed strong 
bonds: the Mafia groups and the politicians.  
 
In the fifth and the last part, the executive power of the state is 
analyzed in the consideration of its (dys)functionality and 
(in)effectiveness in the judicial and administrative divisions of the 
state. This is the last section as it signals that the Mafia's success 
does not simply belong to the efforts of its members building 
their networks but to the promotional and supportive influence of 
the half-functional administrative and justice system of the Italian 
state. 
. 
2. Matsueda’a Theory of Social Networks in the Evaluation 
of Mafia Groups in Italy 
 
Social networking theory has been prominent in many fields: 
social psychology, communications, political science, and so on. 
Apart from these fields, it has gained essential importance for the 
study of organized crime. Moreover, a network perspective can be 
appraised as a social, political, and economic structure as lasting 
prototypes of the relational bonds between the actors.6 Thus, the 
denouncing of these bonds has critical importance for better 
comprehension of the workings of organized crimes like the Mafia 
                                                
5  Matsueda, "Differential social organization," 15. 
6  Jeffrey Scott McIlwain, "Organized Crime: A Social Network Approach," Crime, Law & Social 
Change: An International Journal 32 (Dec. 1999): 301-323. 
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groups in Italy, which have taken their power from social, 
political, and economic discourses.  
It is argued that social networking is also observable in the 
underworld, in the system of organized crimes.7 In this social 
network of the Mafia, the communication networks have an 
essential place because social interactions are the main 
instruments of a social organization.8 In accordance with these 
communication networks, the argument has gained popularity 
which states that the Mafia’s main network systems are 
subordinated by three facts: kinship, patronage, and friendship.9 
Additionally, these relationships, which are huge in number and 
variety, should be latent; each situation ought to be considered 
under their particular needs. Therefore, they have been master in 
binding those individuals in a traditional society. Similar to this, 
"a social network was viewed as a field of interaction that had 
neither units nor boundaries. It was formed by ties of friendship, 
kinship, and acquaintance partly inherited and partly constructed 
by the person himself or herself."10 These kinships, friendships, 
and networking structures of the Mafia phenomenon in Italy will 
be examined in the next sections within its members, local 
people, and politicians. 
 
The role of Matsueda’s noteworthy study11 on social organization 
and crime in this paper cannot be denied. His work on differential 
social organizations, collective action and crime is significantly 
important because it illustrates the conceptualization of an 
organization in favor of, and against crime as collective behavior. 
His figures, which are related with open and closed social 
networks, and local bridges linking two distinct closed networks, 
have been influential on my interpretation of the Mafia’s social 
networks within its members and politicians, respectively. Two 
main reasons explain the use of Matseueda’s approach to 
                                                
7  McIllwain, "Organized Crime: A Social Network Approach," 310. 
8  Charles W. Morris, ed., Mind, Self, and Society, George Herbert Mead 1934, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1968), 253. 
9  Raimondo Catanzaro, Men of Respect: A Social History of the Sicilian Mafia, trans. R. Rosenthal, 
(New York: Free Press, 1992), 43. 
10  Fortunata Piselli, "Communities, Places, and Social Networks," American Behavioral Scientist 50 
(2007): 867-878. 
11  Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime" 
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scrutinize my arguments; first, this is the most appropriate 
orientation for understanding the Mafia’s complex relationship 
background in Italy because it prioritizes goal-focused 
organizations like the Mafia. Secondly, Matseueda prioritizes 
collective behavior, which is pivotal for the analysis of secretly 
bonded informal structures like the Mafia. Therefore, his 
theoretical framework sets the tone for this paper. Replication of 
Matsueda’s figures while analyzing the social networks is the main 
methodological reasoning in the paper. Nonetheless, this paper 
will hopefully bridge the gap in the academic field of Mafia 
research, where no evaluations exists of the Mafia phenomenon 
in Italy that takes into account its social networks and relations 
with members, local people, and politicians all together. 
 
3. Italian Mafia and Its Members 
 
In this part, the regulation of the affairs of the Mafiosi in 
different Mafia groups and the network systems among their 
members are explored. Firstly, the importance of the concepts, 
which make these bonds stronger, is examined, and the meaning 
of these rules and conducts are evaluated from the point of view 
of different Mafia associations like the Sicilian Cosa Nostra (Our 
Affair), the Napolitan Camorra, and the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta 
(Society of Men of Honor). Secondly, there is a need to clarify 
the organizational structure of the members of the Mafia family 
so as to comprehend and examine all components of the network 
system among the Mafia members such as the leadership, and 
the talent of adjustability. Thirdly, the vital importance of 
instrumental friendship, secrecy, and trust are the main notions 
of this section while establishing these networks. Finally, how 
they increase their members and include them in their closed 
network system and further recruitment process are explained 
by using the open and closed network system of Matsueda12 in 
Figure 1. Even though the Mafia associations have been 
successful in building these networks for its members, the 
existing weak parts among members have been emerging as the 
pentiti, Mafiosi, who after being captured, collaborate with the 
justice system and violate the code of silence. They are defined 
                                                
12  Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime," 15. 
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as collaboratori di giustizia (collaborators with justice). This weak 
part in their network system is examined in the second 
subsection, where the importance of their organizational 
structure, trust, and loyalty are explained. 
 
Firstly, the bond among mafia members is defined in three basic 
concepts: conduct, rules, and trust. These concepts have a 
leading role in making close interpersonal relationships and have 
crucial importance for unification in attaining the goals of the 
Mafia. These relationships were labeled as a process for 
"idealization of Mafia phenomenon."13 This is because such an 
idealization would be indispensible for transferring feelings to the 
members of the Mafia associations in that they belong to an 
organization with certain types of ceremonies and norms. 
Thereby, these features are established in order to let the 
members feel themselves as ‘man of honor’. Additionally, these 
structural rituals create very close formations based on strong 
trust among the members, which are prominent for the existence 
of their future. Furthermore, trust and close personal 
relationships are fundamental for the strength of their networks.  
 
The struggle to be a family has significant importance for the 
different Mafia associations. From here, the concept of ‘family’ is 
the symbol of close relationships, secrecy, and trustworthiness 
as is expected of an ordinary family. Moreover, although blood 
kinship is a natural circumstance of an ordinary family, this is not 
always the case for different Mafia groups. For instance, 
formation of Mafia organizations, especially La Cosa Nostra, 
resembles a very large family, whose thousands of members are 
strongly bonded and secretly oriented. This is not preferable but 
demonstrates that having blood kinship is not indispensible. On 
the contrary, the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta does not illustrate any 
hierarchical structure like the La Cosa Nostra but embraces a 
cell-based approach and the importance of blood kinships are 
more observable.14 Despite the existence of the differential 
                                                
13  Letizia Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods, Organized Crime, Italian Style (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 89. 
14  Christine Spolar, "New Mafia gains power in Italy, baffling law enforcement," Chicago,13 July 
2008, in  http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080713/NEWS07/807130540 
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structural formations among different Mafia groups, they have 
corresponding points, such as the importance of secrecy, the 
perception of being a family (with or without blood kinship), and 
demonstrating loyalty.  
 
Secondly, I argue that the organizational structure of the Mafia 
indicates differences among Mafia groups, but the same factor 
influencing contributions of the new members has not changed; 
this is the protection of the secrecy and building trust in order to 
reduce risks in the closed network system. The formation of the 
numbers of members, their kinship and territorial basement may 
vary from one type of Mafia group to another. For instance, the 
traditional Cosa Nostra is a male-dominated family structure 
ruled by a code of conduct for members forbidding them from 
sharing the secrets of their organization.15 Moreover, any 
disobedience may result with violence against the violator of the 
‘code of conduct.’ Similarly, Sicily’s Cosa Nostra and the 
Calabrian ’Ndrangheta are observed as typical representations of 
the Mafia, and each is composed of more than 90 clans or 
‘families.’ Certainly the most powerful are the Cosa Nostra clans, 
which have some 3,200 members concentrated in western 
Sicily.16 The mainland counterpart to the Cosa Nostra is the 
’Ndrangheta, whose homeland is in the southern Calabrian 
province of Reggio Calabria. Around 4,500 members are grouped 
into some 90 clans or cosche, "a Sicilian term for ‘artichoke,’ 
which is intended to symbolize their intense cohesion."17  
 
Finally, while establishing the new closed network system, Mafia 
members use special phrases and choose new members to 
include in their organizational chart by considering the strategic 
professions of those people from whose expertise they will 
benefit. In its special secrecy, instrumental friendship becomes 
crucially important while knitting the Mafia’s network system to 
establish its basis as it is vital in order to make their informal 
                                                
15  Donald Ray Cressey, Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operation of Organized. Crime in 
America (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 114-119, 242. 
16  Letizia Paoli, "Family Crises among the ‘Man of Honor," Research et Society. Max Planck Research, 
2 (2004) 58-59. 
17  Paoli, "Family Crises among the ‘Man of Honor," 59. 
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organization more powerful through enlarging their members 
with strong bonds and specific communication systems. Thus, 
the expressions ‘Tell him that I sent you’ or ‘Go in my name’ are 
used in the Mafia network as a way of communication.18 These 
phrases create special bonds, which lead to the production of the 
social networks described in a popular way as ‘the friends of the 
friends.’ (Figure-1) 
 
Furthermore, when the notion is Mafia phenomenon, a distinction 
should be made between different Mafia groups because the Cosa 
Nostra and ‘Ndrangheta mainly prefer new members for 
recruitment from their neighborhood or towns in southern Italy.19 
Conversely, the Camorra illustrates different characteristics and 
can establish its networks outside of their family or town if the 
candidate has the potential to increase the effectiveness of the 
organization.20 Finally the biggest fourth Mafia group from Puglia, 
Sacra Corona Unita (United Sacred Crown), consists of three main 
layers hierarchically, but it is important to note that a member 
can graduate its stature in the organization through 
demonstrating violence. The formations for closed networks and 
connection among the members have crucial importance for the 
Sacra Corona Unita because the networking should be like a ring 
of a chain.21 Even though there are differences in the formation of 
different mafia groups, one common point is both crucial and 
indispensible. This is the creation of trust as a value and its 
importance for the targets of the Mafia. The utmost importance of 
trust comes from "an emergent property of the social system, as 
much as a personal attribute. Individuals are able to be trusting 
(and not merely gullible) because of the social norms and 
networks within which their actions are embedded."22 Trust has 
been established by the symbols and signs in the alteration of the 
Mafia’s network system from an open to closed network in order 
to add new members to their organization. (Figure-1) 
                                                
18  Catanzaro, Men of Respect: A Social History of the Sicilian Mafia, 54. 
19  Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crimes, Italian Style, 18-47. 
20  Tom Behan, The Camorra (London: Routledge, 1996), 191 
21  Antonio Nicaso and Lee Lamothe, Global Mafia; The New World Order of Organized Crime, 
(Toronto: McMillan, 1995), 69. 
22  Robert D. Putnam., Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton Universitiy Pres, 1993), 177. 
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After the descriptive and normative formation of the Mafia 
members’ network system, it is time to illustrate it through the 
open and closed network system of Matsueda.23 I argue that the 
well-organized communication system of different Mafia groups 
has a leading role in the construction of well-working social 
networking. Clarity for this argument may be enhanced by 
focusing on the study of Matsueda. He states that "given common 
everyday knowledge of the way in which these structures 
operate, individuals can use the structures strategically, seeking 
out closed structures to increase control over members."24 He 
also added that in Figure 1a, both A and B can have influence C, 
but that they can only do it  independently and with the help of 
individual sanctions, developing trust, establishing norms, and 
the like. However, they cannot influence each other because of 
the lack of social ties. As in Figure 1b, after this network is 
established, a close network system is built so that A’, B’, and C’ 
can influence each other by developing coordinated strategies, 
simultaneous sanctions, and similar rhetorical arguments.25 
 
For the case of the Mafia system, while they are building their 
social networks for increasing their members and/or to solve the 
problems of their customers or to make cooperation with them, 
they effectively create a closed social network system through 
‘trust’ and the famous phrase, ‘tell him that you are friend of 
mine.’ Thus, after establishing a network followed with 
requirements about efficiency, reliability, and trustworthiness, a 
new member in the Mafia structure can take his place in this 
closed social network. He is not in the open structure anymore, 
but in the closed structure, where he should now obey the Mafia 
‘rules’. Additionally, the other significant feature is the importance 
of stability in the closed groups, which is gained through strong 
ties among members with similar ideas and homogeneity.26 Thus, 
the creation of this strong closed network among its members 
                                                
23  Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime," 15. 
24  Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime," 14. 
25  Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime," 13-14. 
26 M. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (May 1973):1360-
1380. 
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has crucial magnitude in the targets of the Mafia thanks to the 
principles of solidarity and commitment. Despite differences in 
the structuring of Mafia associations, they all have the same 
common thread of trust and secrecy. 
 
Figure 1. Replication of open and closed social networks 
 
a. Open structure                             b. Closed structure               
 
Source: Ross L. Matsueda, "Differential Social Organization, Collective 
Action and Crime," Crime, Law, and Social Change, 46 (2006), 14. 
 
At this point, after examining the strengths of the Mafia while 
recruiting new membership, it remains important to stress the 
weaknesses of this network. Traditionally, secrecy is perceived 
as the most important criteria for membership. Contrary to this 
strict rule, Mafiosi have collaborated with police after capture on 
many occasions. Therefore, they violated these rules by 
becoming pentiti and sharing their secrets with the criminal 
justice system. Even Mafia leaders, through being pentiti, have 
violated these rules. Accordingly, such violations are a natural 
outcome of being arrested. This is because many Mafiosi prefer 
the favorable sentencing and privileges resulting from 
cooperating with the justice system. Thereby, the pentiti emerge 
as a significant weakness of different Mafia groups in Italy; the 
closed network system sustains its strength until the arrest of 
Mafiosi. 
  
The first pentito in 1973, Leonardo Vitale, confessed significant 
secrets; albeit he did not receive sufficient attention for his 
confessions because of his mental problems. Apart from him, the 
most significant Mafioso turned pentito was Tommasso Buscetta 
CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 5, No. 3 
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in the 1980s. He helped prosecutor Giovanni Falcone in the 
identification of the main channels that the Mafia operated. 
Especially after the Maxi Trial process during the mid 1980s, 
important Mafioso figures decided to be pentiti, such as Salvatore 
Contorno, Antinino Calderone, Giovanni Brusca, and so on.27 In 
addition to this, it has rarely been observed that such 
collaboration has been done with willingness when there is no 
possibility for arrest. Therefore, the consistency, solidarity, and 
loyalty to the Mafia are widely followed until arrest. In sum, the 
success of Mafia groups has been limited by pentiti. Confessions 
of Mafiosi have played as an essential role many times to resolve 
the networks of different Mafia groups. 
 
4. Italian Mafia and Local People 
 
This section aims to show the well-established communication 
networks of different Mafia groups, who take their territorial 
power from the relationships between Mafiosi and the locals. 
Throughout the section, territorial power of different Mafia 
groups is examined, which is a significant instrument to improve 
their influence over the local people. Firstly, Kohlberg’s stages of 
moral reasoning will be applied to examine the bond between 
Mafia groups and local people. Secondly, I will argue that the 
weaknesses of these networks is again the local people, who 
have tried to show resistance against the Mafia by protesting the 
Mafia individually or establishing civil associations against its 
culture.  
 
In this section, the main concern is adaptation of Kohlberg’s28 
and Piaget’s stages of moral reasoning,29 which Matsueda 
references as well.30 This adaptation is focused on the 
relationships between the Mafia and local people on the one 
hand, and local people’s reactions to these relationship bonds on 
the other. Firstly, it is necessary to elaborate Kohlberg’s three 
                                                
27  Martin Bull and James Newell, Italian Politics: Adjustment under Duress (Cambridge: Polity Pres, 
2005), 111. 
28   Lawrance Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development  (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981) 
29  Jean Piaget, The Child’s Conception of the World (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1928) 
30  Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime" 
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levels and six stages of moral reasoning31 before making such a 
deep assessment. These six stages are based on the 
relationships between parents and children. I replicated the 
relationship between the child and parents to the relationship 
between Mafia and local people can be explained because of the 
similarity of those actors. The emergence of the Mafia from the 
late 19th century, its changing situation over time and its 
authoritative and repressive role in the contemporary era may 
share the attitudes of the parents who demonstrate violence to 
their children along with an irresponsible attitude. 
 
In the application of these principles, I examine the relationship 
between the locals and the historical Mafia, which exists in the 
towns of southern Italy and also in urban life in  recent decades. I 
argue that since the middle of the 19th century, stage 1, stage 2, 
and stage 3 occurred and that stage 4 occurred partially because 
the representative of the ‘law and order’ was not extensively 
identical with the Mafia but did come under state control, 
particularly after the Maxi-trial in 1986. Additionally, this stage 
has not been completed because of the existence of 
untrustworthiness in the region, and 
 
Table 1. Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning 
Levels Stages 
Level 1 Pre-Conventional Morality     Stage 1. Obedience and 
punishment orientation 
 Stage 2. Individualism, 
exchange, and instrumentalism 
Level 2 Conventional Morality Stage 3. Good relationships  and 
mutual expectations 
 Stage 4. Law and order 
Level 3 Post-Conventional Morality Stage 5. Social contract and 
individual rights 
 Stage 6. Universal ethical             
principles 
Source: Ross L. Matsueda, "Differential Social Organization, Collective 
Action, and Crime," Crime, Law, and Social Change, 46 (2006), 11. 
 
                                                
31   Lawrance Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development   
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less likely, because of locals' willingness to cooperate with the 
justice system, although this number has increased in recent 
decades. I assert that the Mafia phenomenon in Italy can widely 
be eradicated from the country after the end of stage 4, where all 
residents of the southern region and the entire country admit the 
supreme power of the culture of lawfulness and legality and have 
sufficient encouragement to stand against the Mafia. Post-
conventional morality is the last level in Italian society that ought 
to be reached, as it is a level of morality to rid the severe grip of 
the Mafia. Stages 5 and 6 in this last level may provide an ideal 
country, where the Mafia cannot invade the social, political, and 
economic arenas anymore by subordination of the local people 
physically, psychologically, and sociologically.  
 
To fully comprehend such a relationship between local people and 
Mafia groups, I explain step-by-step how I raise these arguments 
through following three levels and six stages of Kohlberg’s moral 
reasoning. The first stage – obedience and punishment – occurred 
with the emergence of the Mafia phenomenon in the middle of the 
18th century and was observed extensively until the period of the 
contemporary Mafia. Obeying the rules and not to be punished by 
the Mafiosi have been violated frequently in the last decade, but 
the fear of punishment by the Mafiosi is still effective in both rural 
areas and cities of Mezzogiorno – southern Italy. The local people 
witnessed brutality and violence publicly and observed clearly 
what happened to those who did not take Mafia threats seriously. 
These people paid for this opposition with their lives. Undoubtedly, 
an unequal relationship clearly exists between locals and the 
Mafiosi like the one that exists between a child and its 
authoritative parents. The Mafioso was the supreme authority over 
the local people.  
 
The second stage – individualism and exchange – was accordingly 
the outcome of such oppression. Security has been one of the 
crucial elements in taking care of the community and society. With 
violence that puts your life in danger, consideration of long term 
societal benefits is not expected, so from an egocentric 
perspective, the security of your life becomes more significant. 
This is also the reason why the Mafia has become more powerful 
through the features of this network structure and that people 
CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 5, No. 3 
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valued it to ask for ‘private protection.’32 For these reasons, people 
preferred to obey ‘omertà’ –code of silence- with any issue relating 
to the Mafia. These first two stages would be labeled as pre-
conventional morality reasoning, which emerged in the 
atmosphere of violence, embezzlement, and oppression, so 
egocentrism and personal benefits became the priority for the 
local people to survive under such a brutality. 
 
The second level – conventional morality – has not been 
terminated completely yet. Although the third stage – good 
relationships and mutual expectation – has come to an end, the 
fourth stage – law and order – is still in the process of 
completion. If I start from the third stage, this process has 
almost been completed in the demonstration of people’s attempts 
to consider the benefits of society as a whole through organizing 
civil societies and non-governmental initiatives against the Mafia. 
Aside from the anti-Mafia movement, local people have showed 
their cooperation by being pentiti and breaking the order of 
silence. In this regard, people who cooperated with authorities 
labeled their act as ‘good’ and the Mafia as ‘bad’. Thus, they 
started improving ‘good relationships’ with the justice, police, and 
administrative organizations of the state. On the other hand, this 
optimistic panorama can be deceptive because local people 
should take the most crucial step, the fourth step, in the fight 
against the Mafia. The supreme power of rule of law and the 
benefits of society, which are based on legality, should be the 
main cornerstone in the fight against the Mafia. Unfortunately, 
such a decisive struggle has not been observed in the region. For 
instance, in Sicily, the majority of the people and local shops still 
pay pizzo, a protection racket.33 In sum, the completion of the 
fourth stage and establishing the pure mechanism of law and 
order in the region is significantly prominent to terminate the 
second level – conventional morality. The devastating history of 
the local people and the relationships with the Mafia should not 
                                                
32  Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), 3, 26-29. 
33  Francesca Forno and Carina Gunnarson, "Everyday shopping to fight the Italian Mafia," in Michele 
Micheletti and Andrew S. McFarland  eds., Creative Participation: Responsibility-Taking in the Political World, 
(Paradigm Publishers, Bolder, 2009), 101-110. 
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be underestimated for the completion of the third step on a 
permanent basis. After the victory of the fourth stage, the last 
level is likely to be less challenging. 
 
The last level – post-conventional morality – can only occur in the 
last steps of the fight if it becomes possible to eradicate the Mafia 
from the country completely. The fifth step – social contract and 
individual rights – may increase its importance on Italian citizens 
in an environment where they can enforce the political spectrum 
with mass social movements to ask for decisive and ad hoc 
policies, only associated with the social contract, whose particular 
characteristic recognizes the benefits of both individuals and 
society through anti-corruption, transparency, accountability, and 
matured democracy. Therefore, in the last step, it can be possible 
to talk about the universal values and ethics after taking account 
of the full consensus of the citizens’ participation in this process. 
In the last place, after a significant victory has been gained 
against the Mafia, the remaining Mafiosi breaking away from their 
illegal and violent business so they may potentially turn towards 
these universal values and ethics. This argument has already 
found its echoes in the definition of social equilibrium of Putnam. 
The high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic 
engagement and collective well-being are noted as the traits to 
define civic community.34 In this regard, attaining the last level 
depends on the establishment of these traits so as to be a 
recognized civic community who demonstrates consistent 
resistance against the Mafia. 
 
Finally, a weakness also exists in the networks of the Mafiosi with 
the local people. Although this weak part has not been directly 
related to the success or failure of the Mafiosi, it has an indirect 
effect, which causes direct resistance from the local people to 
increase their voice against the subordination of the Mafia. It still 
remains difficult to declare that this weak part is strong enough 
to break all these networks of the different Mafia groups among 
the local people in today’s Italy. But it contains in itself an 
opportunity for the future to demolish its networks when the 
resistance of the local people is extended and becomes powerful 
                                                
34  Putnam., Making Democracy Work, 177. 
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enough to replace the culture of illegality with the culture of 
lawfulness.  
 
The first strikes of this resistance appeared generally as 
individual reactions. For instance, Italian journalist Mauro de 
Mauro was kidnapped by the Mafia in 1970 when he tried to 
investigate a murder.35 Secondly, in 1978 the Cosa Nosta 
murdered Giuseppe Impastato, a significant anti-Mafia figure and 
political activist. He was born in a Mafia family but decided to 
fight against the Cosa Nostra and paid for it with his life. This was 
the striking proof that the Mafia brutally reacts when their 
networks and ‘respectability’ are targeted. Mauro de Mauro and 
Giuseppe Impastato were not the only victims of this resistance. 
Libero Grassi was a businessman who refused to pay pizzo, 
extortion money, and he advertised in the newspaper by calling 
on other businessmen not to pay racket to the Mafia. He was 
murdered in 1991.36 Furthermore, the tragic assassinations of the 
prosecutors Giovanne Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 1992 had 
been the limit for the civil society to illustrate their reaction in a 
well planned and intensive way. All these individual attempts to 
seek the Mafia’s dirty works and to fight against it lead to 
attaining societal reactions against the Mafia. Thereby, Libera was 
established in 1995 as a non-profit civil society aimed at fighting 
against the Mafia and giving self-esteem and support to the local 
people who show their resistance to it. This resistance has been 
institutionalized with over 1000 associations in the country, but it 
is still far from declaring that victory in this fight. Apart from 
Libera, many other civil society organizations were established to 
align themselves in the fight against the Mafia. What is more, this 
struggle should not be underestimated because of its potential to 
devastate local networks of the Mafiosi. For instance, in 2009, 
over 100,000 people gathered in Naples and marched against the 
Mafia.37 Even though dominance of the different Mafia groups is 
                                                
35  Peter Popham, "Revealed: How Story of Mafia Plot to Launch Coup Cost Reporter His Life," The 
Independent, (June 19, 2005) [database on-line]; Available at: 
 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/revealed-how-story-of-mafia-plot-to-launch-
coup-cost-reporter-his-life-494619.html 
36  Dino Paternostro, "Libero grassi, martire civile," La Sicilia, August 30, 2009. 34.  
37  Cristiano Corvino, "Tens of Thousand March in Naples against the Mafia," Reuters (21 March, 
2009), [database on-line]; Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52K0Z220090321 
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still clearly observable in southern Italy, these popular protests 
are the weak part of the networks of the Mafiosi on local people 
who demonstrated clear reluctance  to react against the Mafia for 
dozens of years. 
 
Therefore, the success of the Mafia's influence on local people 
depends on many factors, such as the socio-historical situation of 
the region, cultural patriarchy, economic factors, the lack of the 
existence of a responsible state mind in the region, and a 
combination of all these paradigms. All these reasons need to be 
counted in this complex sociological concentration of the Mafia. 
Further, if we do not consider their well-calculated social network 
system and influence on the local people through these networks, 
any explanation is far from complete. Indeed, I assert that the 
power of this network comes from the strong bond between local 
people and authoritative manner of the Mafiosi. This also makes 
it challenging to prevent the Mafia's extended power , but the 
recent civil society efforts to eradicate the Mafia provide hope for 
the future and become the weak link of the Mafia’s networks 
within the local people. 
 
5. Italian Mafia and Politicians 
 
In this section, I argue that the relationship between Mafiosi and 
politicians is one based on mutual benefits. The polls are given 
as an example to indicate intersected points where the Mafiosi 
and politicians correspond. Secondly, I conclude that the 
contextual events are influential in the evaluation of the collusion 
between the politicians and the Mafia from the perspective of 
decaying corrupted institutions. Finally, I assert that the 
sensitive bond between politicians and the Mafia is the main 
concern. The argument concentrates on the sensitivity of this 
bond as the outcome of the existing weak link between 
politicians and Mafiosi, which is expecially vulnerable due to the 
lack of emotional attachment. I will illustrate my argument with 
Figure 2 through Matseuda’s weak tie of two strong closed 
networks. This deficiency of the emotional bond has also been 
the weak part of their successfully renowned history and mutual 
benefits, which is hard to discover but easy to break after its 
emergence. 
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I argue that the symbiotic relationship between Mafiosi and 
politicians dominates their networks, taking into account the 
benefits of both parts. In this context, the commencement of this 
strong relationship should be perceived as a historical 
phenomenon whose roots were established on the symbiotic 
bond of each party in the criminal world because of its appetite 
for profits.38 This bond managed to extend to the entire political 
system, especially after the emergence of the Mafia in the 19th 
century. In the meantime, this poison seems to have had an 
aphrodisiac-like effect in the spectrum of the cooperative Mafia-
political nexus. Moreover, the pure dependency of politicians on 
the territorial power of the Mafia was more apparent during 
elections because winning a local or parliamentary election is 
almost unachievable without accepting Mafia protection.39 The 
Mafia had another arm in the Senate and Chamber of the Duties 
to use for their ends, which were mostly related with the political 
and administrative handicaps they faced.40 Thus, this system, 
which consists of real power groups, may have the potential to 
deeply affect political life by using its influence on people’s 
decisions during the elections.41 In sum, the baseline of these 
mutual relationships was determined by the obsessive power 
holders between the Mafiosi and politicians. The polls also can 
give clues about the rising power of the Mafia and it becomes 
clear after the emergence of Silvia Berlusconi in the political 
arena in the first half of the 1990s. That was interpreted as a 
‘vicious circle’: "More than a few corrupt Christian Democrats 
and Socialists who were voted out in the anti-Mafia climate of 
the 1990s are now finding their way back into office – most of 
them as candidates for the right-wing conservative camp of 
Silvio Berlusconi’s governing coalition."42 In the last elections, by 
presenting the unified list under the slogan of Casa della Libertà 
                                                
38  Pierre Tramblay and Carlo Morselli, "Patterns in Criminal Achievement; Wilson and Abrahamse 
Revisitied" Criminology 68 (May 2000): 659-663. 
39  Gaetona Mosca, "Che Cosa è la Mafia," in G. Mosca, Partiti a sindacati nelle crisi del regime 
parlamentare (Bari: Laterza, [1900] 1949), 243. 
40  Catanzaro, Men of Respect, 54,142, 201. 
41  Salvatore F. Romano, Storia Della Mafia (Salerno: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1966), 172. 
42  Paoli, "Family Crises among the ‘Man of Honor," 62. 
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(‘House of Liberty’) more essentially, they gained extensive 
success by winning 60 direct seats.43  
 
Political institutions, contextual events and even international 
settings may help to shed light on the relationship between 
politicians and Mafiosi. For instance, Propaganda Due (P2) was a 
secret Masonic lodge whose members are comprised not only of 
journalists and people from business and industry but also of 
members of parliament like Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.44 P2 
influenced taking over Corriere della Sera, a prominent Italian 
newspaper,45 misleading police in the investigation of the 1980 
Bologna Massacre which resulted with death of 85 people.46 
Secondly, Gladio, the secret organization, was influential in Italy 
in creating resistance against communism with the collaboration 
of the CIA and other Mafia associations in Italy. The collusion of 
the Gladio with the politicians and the underworld have 
structured the political spectrum after post-war Italy and was 
used as yet another justification for mafia-politicians collusion.47 
Thirdly, Prime Minister Aldo Moro was killed in 1978 by a 
communist organization, Red Brigades, and it is argued that he 
was not saved by the Italian government because of fear that 
Moro could confess about Gladio.48 Moreover, one of the most 
significant examples was the operation of ‘Clean Hands’. During 
this operation, 3,200 suspected bureaucrats and politicians were 
convicted between 1992 and 2002.49 Unfortunately, even before 
these corruptions, Mafia dominance in politics was expressed and 
approved by state funded organizations like the Ant-Mafia 
Commission which was established in 1962.50 Thus, it is clear 
                                                
43  Paoli, "Family Crises among the ‘Man of Honor," 63. 
44  Jones Tobias, The Dark Heart of Italy (London: Faber & Faber, 2003), 186-187. 
45  Paul Gingsborg, Italy and Its Discontents; Family, Civil Society, State: 1980 – 2001, (New York: 
Palgrave McMillan, 2003), 144-148. 
46   
47  Bull and Newell, Italian Politics: Adjustment under Duress (Cambridge: Polity Pres, 2005), 100. 
48  Par Hubert Artus, "Pourquoi le pouvoir italien a lâché Aldo Moro, exécuté en 1978," Rue8, 6 
February 2008, available at: http://www.rue89.com/cabinet-de-lecture/pourquoi-le-pouvoir-italien-a-lache-
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49  Maffei and Betsos, "Crime and Criminal Policy in Italy," 474. 
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Press, 1998), 50. 
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that other secret organizations accompanied the Mafia in the 
second half of the 20th century after the manipulation of Italian 
social and political life by the Mafia during the first half of the 
20th century. It is remarkable to stress that the state 
demonstrated the capacity to counter attack on the Mafia and 
secret organizations. In this respect, Maxiprocesso, Maxi Trial, 
was held between 1984 and 1986. As a result, hundreds of 
Mafiosi were put behind bars. The destruction of the secret 
organization like P2 and Gladio and the operations of Clean 
Hands occurred during the 1990s. In recent years, famous Mafia 
Godfathers like Bernardo Provenzano and Salvotore Russo were 
captured. These developments have created the perception that 
the fight against the Mafia has gradually been more successful. 
But, the confession of the son of the former mayor of Palermo, 
Massimo Ciancimino, caused the public to doubt the anti-Mafia 
struggle of Berlusconi government. He declared that Forza Italia, 
led by Berlusconi, was the result of negotiations between the 
state and Cosa Nostra, Sicilian Mafia.51  
 
Therefore, in order to make these complex networks more 
observable systematically, there is a need to elaborate and 
illustrate the network relations between politicians and the Mafia 
on a figure. According to Matsueda, as shown in Figure 2, closed 
network groups can establish weak ties with other closed groups 
to have benefits from information flows, novel ideas, more so, 
since all these exchanges are coming from a set of comparatively 
dissimilar groups.52 In addition to this, the weak ties between 
different closed networks provide group members chances to 
increase the likelihood of group members who organize into 
social movements.53 For the case of the Mafia, the weak tie 
between C and E in Figure 2 represents the mutual outcomes of 
this network between the Mafia and politicians and bureaucracy 
in the state. Furthermore, it is argued that resource mobilization 
theory through the utilization of the maximum benefits of the 
                                                
51  "Forza Italia Born from Mafia Talks," Ansa, 8 February 2010, available at 
http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubriche/english/2010/02/08/visualizza_new.html_1701529485.html 
52  Matsueda, "Differential Social Organization, " 15. 
53  Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology 78(May 1973): 
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rational actors by using their social networks and political 
opportunities is significant with collective action.54 It remains 
important to stress that in order to design such collective action, 
civic engagement is less likely to be observed with the lack of 
trust in politicians.55 With hindsight it is clear that this is the road 
taken by the political institutions and regional governments in 
order to make cooperation with the Mafia.  
  
Besides, the significance of the accordance for the objectives and 
the struggle to employ them to make their targets attainable has 
become the remarkable argument for the criminal world.56 This 
argument is also operative for the case of the Mafia. On the one 
hand, the Mafia worked for politicians to help them win elections, 
or to make their positions stronger and support bureaucrats 
through bribes. On the other hand, its position and businesses 
became more and more secure under the protective umbrella of 
the state bureaucrats and politicians. This mutual network 
structure between the Mafia and the dark side of the state is one 
of the essential proofs as to why the vicious cycle of the Mafia 
has not been terminated to date. Their meeting point to serve 
their mutual benefits makes this bond stronger but not 
unbreakable. Furthermore, this bond is weak when we compare 
two groups’ network structures, which are based on rules, laws, 
and regulations for both the informal organization of the Mafia 
and the formal organization of the state. Therefore, since this 
bond between C and E (see Figure 2) is based on mutual 
material benefits but not strong emotional bonds, this tie can be 
defined as paradoxically weak but strong in terms of resisting 
showing their relationships explicitly. Moreover, the 
indispensable relationship between the Mafia and politicians is 
vulnerable when their benefits are at risk. Therefore, in this 
regard, this tie is also weak but breaking it is difficult since this 
                                                
54  Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview 
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symbiotic relationship of the two closed group networks has a 
very little strategic gap that can harm their bonds. 
 
Figure 2. Replication of the Local Bridge (weak tie) linking 
two distinct closed networks 
 
Source: Ross L. Matsueda “Differential Social Organization, Collective 
Action, and Crime.” Crime, Law, and Social Change 46:3-33, p. 15, 
2006.) 
 
 
6. Italian Mafia and Executive Power of the State 
 
In this section, the role of the executive power of the state in its 
relationships with different Mafia groups is examined. I argue 
that the two most critical elements, dysfunctionality and 
ineffectiveness of the judiciary and administration systems of the 
state, fostered the power of the different Mafia groups. Even in 
the last decade, the performance of these institutions has 
gradually increased, but is far from filling the gap that has 
existed since Italian unification in 1861. First I elaborate on the 
role of the executive power of the state from the concepts of 
violence and power. I then examine the reliability of state 
institutions in the country. Finally, I scrutinize today’s political 
arena in the country and the latest developments in this field.  
 
Firstly, it is necessary to make the connection between how the 
Mafia became successful in the absence of state  power and their 
background knowledge of society. Further,  the state’s 
ineffectiveness in promoting territorial order made the Mafia's 
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infrastructure more profitable and serviceable. In the meantime, 
the origins of the Mafia’s emergence provided them with good 
knowledge of the society’s reaction, formation, and attitudes.  
Thus, the strength of the Mafia’s enduring position is related with 
their strong social networks, which were established in the 
consideration of the historical process and in mastering 
adaptability and power orientation. Using these features, the 
Mafia gained benefits for their ends through cooperating with 
politicians and legal authorities in the lines of the mutual 
outcomes. 
 
Today’s Italian administrative and justice system are in serious 
decline in terms of efficiency and reliability, which makes the 
Mafia’s position more durable. The decrease in public confidence 
in the justice system creates a dangerous atmosphere in the 
country.57 In support of this argument, "Italian criminal courts 
seem unable to deal with the backlog of cases. Further, a 2006 
pardon law intended to put an end to the endemic overcrowding 
of state prisons, has further undermined public confidence in the 
state’s ability to bring justice to criminal matters."58 In fact, 
urgent reform in the Italian justice and administrative system is 
not an issue of recent years but one that stems from the 
historical ineffectiveness of the justice system, which has lead to 
the empowering of the Mafia through the socio-cultural and 
historical structure of the Mezzogiorno (southern Italy) since the 
mid-19th century. This appropriate atmosphere for the Mafia 
provides them the best conditions to make their bonds stronger 
and to increase their power and ‘order’ over the society.  
 
Thus, although all these statements draw a pessimistic portrait 
of the fight against Mafia, its elimination from society and state 
units is not unattainable. The severe hit to destroy the Mafia’s 
power and capacity should be breaking up its networks, 
especially the ones established with politicians. In recent years, 
it has been found that "organized crime is negatively related to 
police performance and the rule of law and positively related to 
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grand corruption."59 In this context, if organized crime is more 
powerful, legislation, policy-making, and legal rulings may not be 
in the general interest of the public but to benefit the few.60 
Moreover, the importance of the value network cannot be denied 
by the essential struggle of the police through following goods, 
knowledge, and the connections between actors.61 According to 
this approach, the cooperation of legislative officers, analysts, 
and investigating officers may provide crucial support to resolve 
the organized crime networks. Above all, in order to break up the 
strong networks of the Mafia, what we need is a functional and 
effective justice system, police power, and more operative ways 
to increase local people’s cooperation with the state. The final 
essential requirements are to remove grand corruption and 
increase transparency in public administration and reinforcing 
the executive power of the state with the aim of constituting 
consolidated anti-mafia policies. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The examination of the Italian Mafia groups from the perspective 
of social networks tries to fill a significant void in academia by 
being the first study of the strong and weak parts of these 
networks within three main actors: members, local people, and 
politicians. There is certainly much to be said about the 
importance of Matsueda’s work because his differential social 
organization sheds light on the strong and weak parts of the 
Mafia. Although the main aim of this paper is not to show how to 
resolve these networks, illustrating these strategic strengths and 
weaknesses of their networks may play an important role in 
simplifying the methodology of future research regarding the 
fight against the Mafia phenomenon in Italy. 
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The findings of this paper hopefully fill the gap in the 
interdisciplinary field of social networks and organized crime 
structuring in Italy. These findings declare that the complex 
structure of the Mafia organization among its members, local 
people, and politicians has a strong historical background that 
affects the contemporary situation. Making the strong parts 
weaker and using the weaker parts to demolish the strong ones 
of its networks appear as a crucial strategy to be focused on it. 
Thus, this study’s findings announce firstly the strong parts of its 
networks among the members of the Mafia which are leadership 
factors; their solidarity and commitment until being arrested; the 
rules, codes, and norms in the organizations; adjusting capacity 
to the new situations by making their organizational structure 
tighter or looser according to this change in closed network 
structural formation. Secondly, the strong part of its networks 
established with the local people can be summed up as the 
domination of the people through violence; acting as the 
informal state in their territories; severe punishment of people 
who violate their rules; creating an untrustworthy atmosphere to 
settle private protection; and reference to the ‘man of honor’ or 
‘respectable person’ phrases to legitimize their brutal authority. 
Finally, the politicians who collaborate with Mafia groups in 
exchange for electoral support and bribery in order to get legal 
and political protection summarize the strong parts of its 
networks. Therefore, another outcome of the relationship has 
been the enrichment of the each actor’s benefit in the system of 
corruption. 
 
Apart from the strenghts of these networks, the weaknesses 
provide an opening change for eradicating these networks. The 
first weakness in the network is the violation of their closed 
network system even by the leaders of organizations as being 
pentiti and collaborators with the justice system. Cooperation 
with justice and state organs and violating the basic rules after 
arrest emerge as significant outcomes. When there is no other 
alternative to save themselves, Mafiosi prioritize their personal 
benefits rather than the benefits of their Mafia family and friends 
while cooperating with the state. Secondly, the weakness of the 
networks of local people is the increasing willingness to resist the 
dominance of Mafia groups in the region, albeit this resistance is 
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still in the minority. Civil society groups, non-governmental 
institutions and personal endeavors may potentially lead to a 
decrease in Mafiosi extortion in the long-term. Even though this 
struggle is not directly related with the networks system of the 
Mafiosi, it is the outcome of past acts of violence of the Mafiosi 
against locals who demonstrated resistance against the Mafiosi. 
Finally, the weak part in the network with politicians is their bond, 
which is solely based on material benefit and the lack of any 
emotional link. This weak tie between two strong closed network 
systems is a breaking point when a threat appears and puts the 
benefits of each part in danger. 
 
The second part of the paper focuses on the role of the state and 
it bears emphasis that the state constituted the catalyst in 
fostering both the emergence and empowering of the Mafia 
because of its malfunction in the administrative and justice 
system. The decaying trust in the politicians has made the fight 
to eradicate the Mafia from political and social speres of the 
country quite difficult. At this point, it is worth noting that the 
lack of such a counter position from the state power for 
demolishing the Italian Mafia has made the humus of the Mafia’s 
culture of illegality more resilient over time. If different Mafia 
associations still exist and are invincible in Italy today, albeit in 
the late efforts of the state, their well-built and designed social 
network system has an essential place in this success story of the 
Mafia, but their achievement cannot solely be explained by the 
power of their networks. Ineffective and corrupt state institutions 
along with the cooperation of some politicians with the Mafia and 
the half functional criminal justice system have made the Mafia 
stronger and more overwhelming. Even though there have been 
combative periods to demolish the Mafia, with some fruitful 
results, these periods could never be followed up with 
corresponding and durable cooperation, including all state 
institutions and politicians to destroy the Mafia permanently. In 
contrast, the Mafia has always found another solution to cope 
with any threat or danger by adjusting themselves to the new 
situations through their disciplined and synchronized structure. 
Putting it differently, because of such a boomerang effect in the 
fight against the Mafia, the silence of the different Mafia groups in 
the last decade can create a butterfly effect for the Mafia groups 
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to increase their power and seek new, illegal, and profitable 
markets with a less risky atmosphere by strengthening its weak 
parts. 
 
All of this amounts to saying that both strong and weak parts of 
the social networks of the Mafia should be followed by a well-
designed systematic plan in the contribution of all stakeholders in 
society against the Mafia. At this point, it would be reductive not 
to mention the limitations of this study in order to construct the 
combat plan with the aim of getting rid of the Mafia's grip. Even 
though the Mafia phenomenon has been studied for more than a 
century, the subject contains obstacles because of the criminal 
secrecy of the underworld. In this study, as it commonly occurs in 
other mafia studies, the limitations are firstly based on the 
confessions of the captured Mafiosi. It is doubtful how much 
those confessions can be trusted. Secondly, there may be other 
strong and weak parts of the social networks of the Mafia groups 
which are not mentioned in this study. Thirdly, this study aims to 
focus on the Mafia networks’ from the point view of actor-based 
approach rather than target-based approach so it classified 
networks of the Mafia within local people, politicians and its 
members who are significant national actors in terms of 
emergence of the Mafia and gaining power over those networks. 
Despite these concerns, the limitations of this study provide 
opportunities for future studies of the Mafia as well. Firstly, the 
opportunity arises from taking a social networks approach as the 
point of origin and seeking the targets of the Mafiosi throughout 
those networks. Secondly, this paper is limited to one country 
and it does not examine the international dimension of the 
subject. Further research endeavors can take into account 
international social networks of the Mafia and their influence past, 
present and future. 
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